Social Security and Risk Sharing by Piero Gottardi & Felix Kubler
D  S  E 






Dipartimento  Scienze Economiche 
Department 
of Economics
Ca’ Foscari University of
Venice 
No. 38/WP/2006Working Papers  
Department of Economics  
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice  
No. 38/WP/2006 
ISSN 1827-336X 
The Working Paper Series 
is availble only on line 
www.dse.unive.it/pubblicazioni 
For editorial correspondence, please 
contact: wp.dse@unive.it 
  Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta San Giobbe 
30121 Venice Italy 













University of Venice 
 
Felix Kubler 





In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social 
security system is ex-ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic overlapping generations 
economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent 
with many calibrations of the model used in the literature. In our model financial markets 
are complete and competitive equilibria are interim Pareto efficient. Therefore, a welfare 
improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from 
the possibility of inducing, through social security, an improved level of intergenerational 
risk sharing. We will also examine the optimal size of a given social security system as well 
as its optimal reform. 
The analysis will be carried out in a relatively simple set-up, where the various effects of 
social security, on the prices of long-lived assets and the stock of capital, and hence on 
output, wages and risky rates of returns, can be clearly identified. 
 
Keywords  
Intergenerational Risk Sharing, Social Security, Ex Ante Welfare Improvements, Interim Optimality, 
Price Effects 
JEL Codes 
H55, E62, D91, D58  
 
Address for correspondence: 
Piero Gottardi 
Department of Economics 
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice 
Cannaregio 873, Fondamenta S.Giobbe 
30121 Venezia - Italy 
Phone: (++39) 041 2349192 
Fax: (++39) 041 2349176 
e-mail:gottardi@unive.it 
This Working Paper  is published under the auspices of the Department of Economics of the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice. Opinions 
expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or 
incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional character. 
 
 1 Introduction
The pay-as-you-go social security system in the US was introduced as a tool to mitigate
the eﬀects of economic crises. In a special message to Congress accompanying the draft of
the social security bill President Roosevelt said “No one can guarantee this country against
the dangers of future depressions, but we can reduce those dangers. ... we can provide the
means of mitigating their results. This plan for economic security is at once a measure of
prevention and a measure of alleviation.” (see e.g. Kennedy (1999), page 270). In this paper
we examine to what extent enhanced intergenerational risk sharing through a pay-as-you-go
social security can alleviate the consequences of economic downturns. This idea dates back
to at least Enders and Lapan (1982). More recently, it is used as an argument against
privatization of social security. For example, Shiller (1999a) writes ”If risk management is
to be really eﬀective, it is most important that it help out in the most desperate situations,
and this is what the US government’s social security, ﬁnanced with income taxes, does.”
To properly evaluate whether a social security system allows to improve risk-sharing
it is important to specify the welfare criterion that is used (and hence the market failures
social security may address). If agents’ utility is evaluated at an interim stage, conditionally
on the state at their birth, an improvement can only be obtained if some ﬁnancial markets
are missing, or the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient. While one might argue that in re-
ality crucial markets are missing (in particular annuity markets and markets for securities
that pay contingent on idiosyncratic shocks), this source of ineﬃciency is not speciﬁc to
economies with overlapping generations and other insurance schemes could be introduced
which are Pareto-improving (in particular new ﬁnancial assets, fully funded annuities etc.).
Hence the presence of some missing markets might provide a justiﬁcation for some govern-
ment intervention but does not directly point to social security as an ideal instrument. Using
an interim welfare criterion, several authors have examined the potential beneﬁts of pay-
as-you-go social security systems in realistically calibrated, dynamically eﬃcient economies
with missing markets (see e.g. Imrohoroglu et al. (1999) or Krueger and Kubler (2006)).
They ﬁnd that the negative eﬀects of social security on the capital stock and wages clearly
outweigh, quantitatively, any positive risk sharing eﬀects of such a system.
However, if agents’ welfare is evaluated at an ex ante stage competitive equilibria in
stochastic overlapping generation models are generally suboptimal, even when markets are
complete, because agents are unable to trade to insure against the realization of the uncer-
tainty at their birth. There must then be some transfers between generations which improve
intergenerational risk sharing and constitute a Pareto-improvement. It is then particularly
of interest to investigate under what conditions a pay-as-you-go social security system (or,
more generally, one-sided transfers from the young to the old) is Pareto-improving according
to an ex ante welfare criterion in economies where equilibria are interim Pareto eﬃcient.
In these economies the only possible source of an improvement is the imperfection in in-
tergenerational risk sharing due to the limitations on trading imposed by the demographic
2structure.
In this paper we consider a class of overlapping generations economies where markets
are complete, there is capital accumulation and land, an inﬁnitely lived asset used in the
production process together with labor and capital. The presence of land ensures that
competitive equilibria are interim Pareto eﬃcient. We show that, for a wide range of realistic
speciﬁcations of the parameters of the economy, a pay-as-you-go social security system is
ex-ante Pareto improving and we demonstrate that the eﬀects on the equilibrium price of
land play a crucial role in enhancing the welfare beneﬁts of social security (in a slightly
diﬀerent framework, Diamond and Geanakoplos (2003) already point to the interaction of
social security and land prices).
We consider two period overlapping generations economies with a single1 agent per
generation and stochastic shocks to aggregate production, and analyze three diﬀerent pay-
as-you-go systems: a deﬁned contribution system, where transfers from the young are pro-
portional to their income level, a deﬁned beneﬁts system, where transfers from the young
to the old are state independent, and an ideal system, where any state contingent transfer
from the young to the old is allowed. We decompose the eﬀects of a social security scheme
into: i) a direct transfer from the young to the old (the one prescribed by the scheme),
ii) an indirect transfer (which may have positive or negative sign) induced by the general
equilibrium eﬀects of social security on the stock of capital, and hence on equilibrium wages
and return to capital, and on the price of long lived assets, iii) a change in the level of
total resources available for consumption (due to the change in the stock of capital). In
the simple set-up of the economy considered, we are then able to identify several crucial
conditions (primarily on the covariance between the shocks aﬀecting the agents when young
and old, on their risk aversion, and on the stochastic properties of the production shocks)
under which these diﬀerent components of the eﬀects of a social security scheme have a
positive eﬀect on welfare.
We proceed in steps, by examining ﬁrst the eﬀects of the direct transfer speciﬁed by the
diﬀerent social security schemes. To this end we consider the special case where there is
no production, nor land, so that there is no trade in equilibrium and there are no general
equilibrium eﬀects. We ﬁnd that in order for the introduction of a deﬁned beneﬁts social
security system to be Pareto-improving, we need2 consumption (and hence income) of the
old agents to be positively correlated with the consumption of the young and, at the same
time, to exhibit a higher variability. Similar conditions must hold for a deﬁned contribution
system if risk aversion is suﬃciently large. A weaker condition suﬃces for an ideal system
to be improving: the existence of at least one state where the old are poorer than the
1Since we assume markets are complete, perfect risk sharing can be attained within each generation. We
can abstract then from the heterogeneity within each generation so as to better focus on intergenerational
risk sharing.
2It should be kept in mind that such conditions are derived for competitive equilibria which are interim
eﬃcient.
3young (their discounted marginal utility for consumption exceeds the marginal utility when
young).
Next, we consider the case where land is present, so that we do have a ﬁrst general
equilibrium eﬀect given by the changes in the price of long-lived assets generated by the
introduction of the policy. We ﬁnd that the price of land tends to decrease, so that we have
an indirect transfer from young to old agents of negative sign, which in interim eﬃcient
economies has typically a positive eﬀect on the welfare of future generations. On this basis,
we show that the presence of long-lived assets improves the case for social security, making
the conditions for such policy to be welfare improving less stringent.
With production the introduction of social security in dynamic eﬃcient economies tend
to crowd out the investment in capital and hence to lower output level. Furthermore,
the stochastic structure of the production shocks determine the correlation between wages,
aﬀecting the income when young, and return to capital, aﬀecting the income when old.
While we are able to identify some conditions on the properties of the production shocks
under which the various social security schemes are improving, we show that in general it
is rather diﬃcult to ﬁnd a rationale of pay-as-you-go social security in models with capital
accumulation but without land.
On the basis of this analysis, we examine more general economies, where there is both
land and capital. In this case we solve for equilibria numerically and show that for economies
with somewhat realistic parameter speciﬁcations the introduction of a deﬁned contributions
as well as that of a deﬁned beneﬁts social security system is welfare improving. It turns
out that, while the general equilibrium eﬀect of social security on the equilibrium level of
the stock of capital tends to decrease welfare, this eﬀect is overcompensated by the eﬀect
of the change in the price of land. The sign (and size) of the direct eﬀect is then crucial for
determining if a (deﬁned beneﬁts or deﬁned contributions) social security scheme is Pareto-
improving. As argued above, this direct eﬀect is positive if the consumption when old is
positively correlated, but suﬃciently more volatile, with the consumption when young.
In this set-up we also analyze the optimal size of the diﬀerent social security systems and
ﬁnd that for various parameter speciﬁcations it is rather close to the estimated size of the
US system. Finally, we examine the beneﬁts of reforming an existing social security system
to improve its risk-sharing properties. We ﬁnd that large welfare gains can be obtained by
reforming a pay-as-you-go deﬁned contributions system making social security contributions
state contingent, i.e. by moving in the direction of an ideal system. Such ﬁnding is in line
with Shiller (1999b)’s observation that, the US system’s risk sharing potentials seem limited
in that the young’s transfers to the current old do not depend on the wealth of the young
relative to that of the old.
Starting with Gordon and Varian (1988) several papers have examined the scope for
a pay-as-you-go social security system under an ex ante welfare criterion. Shiller (1999b),
Ball and Mankiw (2001) and De Menil et al. (2005) approach this question by using a
partial equilibrium analysis in that in their model there is no capital accumulation and no
4land, and agents have access to a risky storage technology. As argued in this paper, the
general equilibrium eﬀects induced by social security play a very important role in a proper
assessment of the beneﬁts of costs and beneﬁts of social security.
Bohn (2003) (probably the closest to our analysis, see also Olovsson (2004)) compares the
competitive equilibria with and without social security for a realistically calibrated version
of an economy with capital accumulation. He shows that it is diﬃcult to make an argument
in favor of social security in such set-up. This result, however, depends crucially on the fact
that Bohn abstracts from the presence of long-lived assets and restricts his attention to a
speciﬁc form of production shocks. We should also point out that, without controlling for the
fact that competitive equilibria without social security are interim eﬃcient it is not possible
to properly argue that any welfare gain is due to the improvements in intergenerational risk
sharing induced by social security.
The eﬀects of other forms of ﬁscal policy interventions on intergenerational risk sharing
according to an ex ante welfare criterion have then been studied by various authors. Gale
(1990) analyzes the eﬃcient design of public debt, while Smetters (2004) examines the role
of capital taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the class of economies
under consideration and give conditions for interim and ex-ante optimality. In Section 3
we introduce various social security systems. Section 4 examines the direct eﬀects of such
systems. Section 5 focuses on the equilibrium eﬀects on the price of land and Section 6 on
the eﬀects on capital accumulation. In Section 7 we analyze the eﬀects of the alternative
social security schemes for the economies under consideration, with production and land.
In Section 8 we examine within the same framework the optimal size of a social security
system as well as the welfare improving reforms of an existing system.
2 The OLG economy
We consider a stationary overlapping generations economy under uncertainty with 2 period
- lived agents. Time runs from t = 0 to inﬁnity. Each period a shock s ∈ S = {1,...,S}
realizes. Date-events, or nodes, are histories of shocks, and a speciﬁc date event at t is
denoted by st = (s0...st). We collect all (ﬁnite) histories in an event tree Σ.
There are 4 commodities: capital, labor, a single consumption good, which is perishable,
and a perfectly durable good, land.
As discussed in the introduction, our primary focus is on intergenerational risk sharing.
We will abstract therefore from issues concerning intragenerational risk sharing by assuming
there is one representative agent born at each date-event. The representative agent in each
generation has a unit endowment of labor when young and zero when old as well as an
endowment of the consumption good which depends on age and the current shock; for an
agent born in node st it is given by ey(st) = e
y
st when young and eo(st+1) = eo
st+1 when
old. At a given node st, we denote the consumption of the young agent by cy(st) and
5consumption of the old agent who was born at st−1 by co(st).
Agents’ preferences are only deﬁned over the consumption good and represented by the
time-separable expected utility
Ust
(c) = u(cy(st)) + βEstv(co(st+1))
where u(.) and v(.) are increasing, concave and smooth functions. Agents supply their labor
inelastically: l
y
s = 1 for all s ∈ S. At the root node, s0 there is one initial old agent with
utility U(c) = v(co(s0)).
At each date event st, there is a representative ﬁrm which produces the consumption
good using capital k, labor l and land b as inputs. The ﬁrm’s production function, f, is sub-
ject to stochastic shocks. Given any shock s ∈ S, f(k,l,b;s) is assumed to exhibit constant
returns to scale in capital, labor and land. Capital is obtained from the consumption good
in the previous period via a storage technology: more precisely, one unit of the consumption
good at t − 1 yields one unit of capital in each state at t. Land is perfectly durable and
there is a ﬁxed quantity of it, which we normalize to one.
After the shock is realized, the ﬁrm buys labor and capital and rents land from the
households on the spot market so as to maximize spot-proﬁts. We denote the price at st
of capital by r(st) (in terms of the consumption good whose price we normalize to 1), the
price of labor by w(st), and the rental price of land by d(st), paid by producers to use land
in the current production process.
At date 0 the initial old holds the entire amount of land as well as a given amount
of capital, k(s−1), to which we refer as the ‘initial condition’. Land is then traded by
consumers in the market and q(st) denotes the price of land at st.
Given an initial condition k(s−1), a feasible allocation is ((cy(st),co(st)),k(st)) such that
cy(st) + co(st) + k(st) ≤ est + f(k(st−1),1,1;st) for all st,
where e(st) = e
y
st +eo
st denotes the agents’ total endowment of the consumption good at st.
For simplicity we abstract from population growth or technological progress and assume
the shocks to be i.i.d.; πs denotes then the probability of shocks s occurring. Evidently,
these are not innocuous assumptions when it comes to a quantitative analysis of social
security. However, in this paper we focus largely on more qualitative issues.
In what follows we consider ﬁrst some special cases of this model, where capital is
not productive, (∂f(k,l,b;s)/∂k = ∂f(k,l,b;s)/∂l = 0 for all b,l,k and s), in which
case the economy reduces to a pure exchange one, and/or where land is not productive
(∂f(k,l,b;s)/∂b = 0 for all b,l,k and s), or equivalently where there is no land.
2.1 Optimality
As explained in the introduction, we distinguish between two welfare concepts. Given
an initial condition k(s−1), a feasible allocation ((cy(st),co(st)),k(st))st∈Σ is conditionally
6Pareto optimal (CPO) if there is no other feasible allocation ((˜ cy(st),˜ co(st)),˜ k(st))st∈Σ,
with
Ust
(˜ cy(st),˜ co(st+1)) ≥ Ust
(cy(st),co(st+1)) for all st,t
with the inequality holding strict for at least one st. Thus, in this notion agents’ welfare is
evaluated at the interim stage, after the realization of the uncertainty at the time of birth.
On the other hand, a feasible allocation ((cy(st),co(st)),k(st))st∈Σ is ex ante Pareto-
optimal3 if there is no other feasible allocation ((˜ cy(st),˜ co(st)),˜ k(st))st∈Σ, with
E0Ust
(˜ cy(st),˜ co(st+1)) ≥ E0Ust
(cy(st),co(st+1)) for all t = 0,1,...,
with the inequality holding strict for at least one t.
2.2 Competitive equilibria
A competitive equilibrium is a collection of choices for the households and ﬁrms such that
households maximize utility, ﬁrms maximize spot proﬁts and markets clear. It simpliﬁes
the characterization of equilibria to note that by market clearing, in equilibrium the ﬁrm
will always buy the entire capital and labor and rent the entire amount of land from the
households. Recalling that l
y





st∈Σ , where b(st) denotes the amount of land purchased






i) at each st the young chooses k(st),b(st) to maximize u(cy(st))+βEstv(co(st+1)) sub-
ject to
cy(st) = ey(st) + w(st) − q(st)b(st) − k(st)
















iii) and the land market clears:
b(st) = 1.
The presence of an inﬁnitely lived asset like land, yielding each period a dividend that is
bounded away from zero ensures (see, e.g. Demange (2002)) that competitive equilibria are
conditionally Pareto optimal, i.e. there is no possibility of welfare improvement condition-
ally on the state at birth of each generation. Hence the only possible source of ineﬃciency
in the economy under consideration, when land is productive, is the fact that agents are
unable to trade before they are born to ensure against the state at their birth.
3In the following we will sometimes drop the qualiﬁcation ‘ex ante’.
72.3 Stationary equilibria
The analysis is obviously much simpler when the competitive equilibrium is stationary in




In such situations we can easily derive the conditions for CPO and ex ante optimality of
competitive equilibria and study the welfare eﬀects of stationary taxes and transfers.
Given our assumption that shocks are i.i.d., stationary equilibria always exist in the
special case where capital and labor are not productive (pure exchange), whether or not land
is productive. However, this is no longer true in the presence of production, in which case
only the existence of ergodic Markov equilibria can be established under general conditions
(see Wang (1993) for a proof of existence in an economy without land). We will consider
some special cases where stationary equilibria still exist in the presence of production.
2.3.1 Conditional optimality
As shown by Aiyagari and Peled (1991), Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) (see also
Demange and Laroque (2000) for a model with production), a stationary equilibrium (in the
above sense) is conditionally Pareto optimal if and only if the matrix of the representative






s) ; s,s0 ∈ S
o
has a maximal eigenvalue less
or equal than 1. In our set-up, the separability of the agent’s utility function and the fact
that shocks are i.i.d. imply that this matrix has always rank 1, and its largest eigenvalue is
given by the sum of its diagonal elements. It then follows that a stationary equilibrium is















































The advantage of this formulation is that it clearly shows that CPO requires that at least one
of the two following properties is satisﬁed: (i) on average the marginal utility of consumption
when old is smaller than the marginal utility of consumption when young, (ii) the marginal
utilities of consumption when old and the inverse of the marginal utility of consumption
when young are negatively correlated (or equivalently, when cy and co are co-monotonic,
8cy and co are positively correlated). While (i) is analogous to the condition for optimality
found under certainty (agents should be on average richer when old than when young), (ii)
identiﬁes some speciﬁc properties of the allocation of risk within each generation.
2.3.2 Ex Ante Improving Transfers
At a stationary equilibrium the welfare, evaluated at the ex ante stage, is the same for all








We derive a simple condition under which a stationary allocation cannot be improved by di-
rect stationary transfers between young and old agents. Considering direct transfers is only
a necessary condition for the ex ante optimality of an allocation, as a welfare improvement
could be found by changing also the level of production and investment, as well as with
nonstationary transfers. Since our focus is on the possibility that a stationary social secu-
rity system is welfare improving, it is of particular interest to consider ﬁrst the conditions
where an improvement can be found only with stationary transfers.
Welfare improving stationary transfers do not exist if there isn’t a vector (Ts)s∈S such
that an inﬁnitesimal net transfer from the young to the old agents in the direction of (Ts)s∈S





s))Ts ≥ 0 (4)




s)Ts ≥ 0. (5)
with one at least of the two inequalities being strict.




s)) > 0. Moreover, one can easily see that since the transfers are not restricted to be
positive, an improvement is also possible if the vectors of the marginal utilities when young
and old are are not collinear. Therefore focusing on direct transfers, one can characterize
ex-ante eﬃciency as follows.







s,s0∈S , a necessary and suﬃcient condition








4In the case of stationary Markov allocations a similar condition holds, though the expression is now
evaluated with the invariant probability distribution.
















Thus an improving transfer T should be characterized by a suﬃciently high covariance with
v0(co) and a low covariance with u0(cy).
When ex ante welfare is considered the timing of the introduction of the transfers also
plays a role. In particular, (5) applies to the case where, at the time in which the transfer
scheme is introduced, the transfer starts operating at a given date in all possible states.
We can understand this as describing a situation where the transfer scheme is announced
one period in advance, say at the end of some date t, after some history st, and will be
implemented starting from date t + 1 at every successor node of st (hence there will be
a transfer from the young to the old at date t + 1 for each possible realization s of the
uncertainty at date t + 1).
If on the other hand the transfer scheme were not announced in advance, but began
to operate at date t + 1, when say the current shock is ¯ s, the scheme would be welfare
improving if the following conditions hold, in addition to (4):
π¯ sv0(co
¯ s)T¯ s ≥ 0, (7)
saying that the agents who are old at t + 1 are not worse oﬀ, and:
−u0(c
y




s))Ts ≥ 0. (8)
stating that the agents who are young at t + 1 are also not worse oﬀ. Note that (7) is
equivalent to T¯ s ≥ 0, and given this it follows from (8) that (5) holds. The reverse however
is not necessarily true. We conclude that the set of transfer schemes which are welfare
improving when announced one period before their introduction includes the set of transfer
schemes which are improving when they are introduced at the time of their announcement.
3 Social Security
We model social security as a system of non-negative transfers from the young to the old.
In general the pattern of transfers is described by (τ(st))st∈Σ, where τ(st) ≥ 0. We let ν ≥ 0
denotes the size of the system, so that at any node st the current young transfers ντ(st)
units of the consumption good to the current old.
Actual social security systems in most developed countries are characterized by the fact
that neither the speciﬁcation of taxes nor beneﬁts seem to vary across states of the world.
In various countries, like the US, a social security trust-fund stabilizes imbalances between
beneﬁts and contributions over the business cycle. We will abstract from this feature and not
allow for the presence of a trust-fund, so as to focus on the pure intergenerational transfer
10component of social security systems. Evidently, this fact will lead us to underestimate the
welfare beneﬁts of social security systems.
In what follows, we will therefore restrict our attention to stationary social security
systems that maintain budget balance in every period; i.e., current beneﬁts coincide with
current taxes and the speciﬁcation of the transfer at each node st depends at most on the
current state st, not on past history. We will consider three diﬀerent kinds of stationary
social security systems:
1. In the ﬁrst case, the social security transfer is a suitably designed function of the
current shock. The transfer pattern is thus given by (τs)s∈S, where τs can be any
non-negative number: in each state s ∈ S the current young makes then a transfer
proportional to τs units of the consumption good to the current old. We will refer to
this as an ’ideal’ (stationary) social security system.
2. In the second case the contributions paid by the young are proportional to their
income. Since the latter may vary with the node, so will the level of the tax paid, but
the tax rate is state invariant. That is, for all st, we have:
τ(st) = ey
st + w(st).
We will refer to this as a ‘deﬁned contributions’ social security system since the social
security tax-rate remains constant across states.
3. In the third case considered in this paper, beneﬁts are state invariant. We call a social
security system a ‘deﬁned beneﬁts’ one if, for all s ∈ S, τs = 1.
Feldstein and Liebman (2001) characterize the US pay-as-you-go system as a deﬁned
beneﬁts system and argue that some countries such as Sweden and Italy have deﬁned
contribution programs. The fact however that we require transfers to balance in each
period constitutes, as we already argued, a departure from the features of the social security
systems present in most industrial countries.
The ideal system is an idealization, which provides an important reference point by
allowing us to identify the welfare maximizing stochastic structure of the transfers from
young to old agents and can be contrasted with the welfare improving transfers (Ts)s∈S
discussed in the previous section, where no sign restriction was imposed on Ts. It also
allows us to see how far existing deﬁned beneﬁt or contribution systems are from a welfare-
maximizing system.
In the presence of a social security system (ντ(st))st∈Σ a competitive equilibrium is again









such that households maximize utility, ﬁrms maximize spot proﬁts and markets clear. The
only diﬀerence with respect to conditions i)-iii) of Section 2.2 is the expression of the con-
sumers’ budget constraint, now given by:
11cy(st) = ey(st) + w(st) − q(st)b(st) − k(st) − ντ(st)




b(st) + k(st)r(st+1) + ντ(st+1).
We intend to analyze the welfare eﬀects of an inﬁnitesimal increase of the scale of the
social security system, dν > 0. We decompose these eﬀects into those of the direct transfer
prescribed by the social security scheme, τ(st), and the eﬀects generated by the changes in
equilibrium prices, i.e. by the general equilibrium eﬀects of the change in the scheme.
In the next three Sections, we will consider some special cases where a stationary equi-
librium exists. In these situations the transfers prescribed by the three types of stationary
social security systems described above are also stationary. We show that the economy
reaches a new stationary equilibrium in at most one period after the change in the social
security system. Furthermore, the welfare eﬀects are only given by the eﬀects of the to-
tal transfers generated by the inﬁnitesimal policy change, evaluated at the new stationary
equilibrium (i.e. any change in available resources has no welfare eﬀect). These transfers
can be described by a vector (Ts)s∈S where, in each state s ∈ S, Ts is given by the sum
of the direct transfer τs prescribed by the policy and the indirect transfer induced by the
general equilibrium eﬀects of the policy change. Once the pattern (Ts)s∈S of the total trans-
fers induced by an inﬁnitesimal increase of the scale of a social security scheme (τs)s∈S is
identiﬁed, we can use the analysis in the previous Section to ascertain whether or not such
policy changes improve welfare (in the ex ante sense). For this, it suﬃces to verify whether
conditions (4) and (5) are both satisﬁed for the values of (Ts)s∈S we found.
We will derive the expressions of (Ts)s∈S for the case where the eﬀects of dν are evaluated
at ν = 0, i.e. an inﬁnitesimal amount of social security is introduced, starting from a
situation without social security. It should be clear that the analysis can be immediately
extended to the case where the policy change is evaluated at some ν > 0.
4 Direct Eﬀects of Social Security
We will consider ﬁrst the case of pure exchange, without land (no factor is productive):
there is a unique equilibrium, which is stationary, and given by autarky. While this case is
almost trivial to analyze, it helps in identifying some of the main conditions needed for social
security to be Pareto-improving. In this case in fact the total net transfer Ts induced by the
policy in equilibrium in any state s coincides with the direct transfer τs prescribed by the
policy. The welfare consequences of social security can then just be determined on the basis
of the relationship between the direct transfers (τs)s∈S and the stochastic pattern of the
agents’ marginal utility for consumption (in this case coinciding with their endowments).
In the light of the discussion at the end of Section 2.3.2, we consider the case where the
introduction of the social security scheme is announced one period in advance. Hence to
determine whether the scheme is Pareto improving, we only have to verify that conditions










(one of the two inequalities being strict).
Since the direct transfers τs from young to old agents prescribed by a social security
scheme are required to be non-negative, the initial old are always at least weakly better oﬀ
as a result of the introduction of the scheme (τ(s))s∈S, i.e. the second of the two above
inequalities is always satisﬁed.
4.1 Ideal social security system
All what is required for the existence of a Pareto improving ideal social security system
is that the ﬁrst of the two above condition holds. The circumstances under which this is
possible are readily obtained:
Proposition 2 At an autarkic equilibrium, a Pareto improving ideal social security system
exists if and only if there is at least one state ¯ s for which
βv0(eo
¯ s) > u0(e
y
¯ s).
Intuitively this is a very weak condition: it only requires the existence of one state,
where the time (but not probability) discounted marginal utility of the old is larger than
the marginal utility of the young, i.e. where we can say the old are ’poorer’ than the young.
It is useful to contrast this condition with the necessary and suﬃcient condition (1) for












Obviously, for a large set of economies for which the (autarkic) equilibrium is CPO we can
ﬁnd a Pareto-improving social security system. Conditional optimality, as we saw, requires
that on average the old are ’richer’ than the young, or alternatively that cov(βv0(co), 1
u0(cy)) <
0. As long as there is one shock ¯ s for which the old are ’poorer’ than the young, social
security can be Pareto-improving. The improvement can be attained with nonzero transfers
from the young to the old only in one state, ¯ s. Hence, for all s 6= ¯ s the young agents are
better oﬀ conditionally on the state at birth; if the initial allocation is CPO the the agents
born in state ¯ s must be worse of with social security.
While the analysis shows that an optimally designed social security system can be
Pareto-improving for a large range of parameter values, actual social security systems are
somewhere between deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned contribution. We therefore examine now
these two more realistic cases.
134.2 Deﬁned beneﬁts
When transfers are constant across all shocks, the simple analysis of the autarky case reveals
one surprising necessary condition for a deﬁned beneﬁts social security system to be Pareto
improving.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a deﬁned beneﬁts system to be Pareto im-










Thus the average marginal utility of consumption has to be larger when old than when
young. Recall that the necessary condition for (CPO) in Equation (3) implies that if this





≥ 1, then cov(βv0(co), 1
u0(cy)) < 0 must hold for the
allocation to be CPO.






































0, the second term in (10) has to be strictly positive for (9) to hold.
We have thus shown:
Proposition 3 At a conditionally Pareto optimal autarkic equilibrium, a deﬁned beneﬁts social








The ﬁrst inequality in (11) says that a welfare improving deﬁned beneﬁts system can
only be found when the marginal utility of the old and the inverse of the marginal utility of
the young are negatively correlated. Hence, when the variables describing the endowment
when young and when old are co-monotone, marginal utilities when young and when old
must be positively correlated, i.e., in all states where the old are rich, the young must also
be rich and vice versa! This may come a bit as a surprise as we might have expected
that the margins for welfare improving transfers between young and old, enhancing risk
sharing, would be greater when their income is negatively correlated. We should bear in
mind though that we are limiting our attention here to deterministic transfers, so that
mutual insurance cannot be properly achieved; moreover, the conditional optimality of the
equilibrium imposes some restrictions on the pattern of the variability of consumption when
young and when old5.
5As we already noticed, the ﬁrst inequality in (11) is in fact one of the two alternative necessary conditions
for CPO we obtained from (3).
14Furthermore, when utility is linear-concave or concave-linear (in that either u(c) = c or
v(c) = c), or when ey or eo are deterministic, this condition can never be satisﬁed, so that
an improvement will never be possible with a deﬁned beneﬁt system.
The second inequality in (11) requires that u0(ey) and
v0(eo)
u0(ey) are positively correlated.
Thus, when endowments when young and when old vary co-monotonically, we must have
that not only u0(ey) and v0(eo) are positively correlated, as shown above, but that whenever
u0(ey) increases, v0(eo) also increases, and more than u0(ey). Endowment when old must
then vary in the same direction of the endowment when young, as we saw, but also have to
exhibit a greater variability and/or the old must be more risk averse than the young. Given
this feature, the fact that a deterministic transfer from the young to the old is welfare
improving should not be surprising, since the old are bearing more risk than the young
and it is beneﬁcial for the young to provide them some insurance, even in the form of a
deterministic transfer of income. Since adding a riskless stream of consumption to some
risky level tends to decrease risk, there is a sense in which a deﬁned beneﬁts scheme shifts
risk from the old to the young.
If the necessary condition (11) above is satisﬁed, it is indeed easy to construct examples
where the introduction of a deﬁned beneﬁt system is Pareto-improving. In this regard,
notice that at the golden rule the inequality on the right hand side of (11) is also a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of an improving policy, so for any allocation close enough to the
golden rule, an improvement is possible. Consider for example the case where u(c) = v(c) =
log(c), β = 1, S = 2 and π1 = π2 = 1/2. If endowments are
(ey(1),ey(2)) = (1,2), (eo(1),eo(2)) = (0.75,4)
the economy is conditionally optimal and (9) is satisﬁed. The introduction of a deﬁned
beneﬁts social security system is then Pareto improving. The wealth (and hence the con-
sumption) of young and old agents are clearly positively correlated, and exhibits a higher
variability for the old than for the young agents.
4.3 Deﬁned contributions
Under a deﬁned contributions system the young pay, in each state, a constant fraction of
their income, i.e. τs = e
y
s for all shocks s ∈ S. Hence the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for a deﬁned contributions system to be welfare improving, at an autarkic equilibrium, is
obtained from (4), setting Ts = e
y






s > 0. (12)
The existence of an improving policy requires in this case a condition on the joint pattern
of the agent’s endowment and its marginal utility, so that the elasticity of the agents’ utility
function will play a role.
15Proceeding along similar lines to the previous subsection, we note ﬁrst that the CPO























where, if (12) holds, the second term is greater than one and hence the ﬁrst one has to be
negative.












whose term on the right hand side is positive, whenever the necessary and suﬃcient condition
(12) for the policy to be improving is satisﬁed.
We have proved so the following:
Proposition 4 A necessary condition for a deﬁned contributions system to be Pareto improv-
ing, at a conditionally Pareto optimal autarkic equilibrium, is:6
cov(βv0(eo)ey,
1




Note that the condition does not rule out the possibility that in this case an improvement
may be found even when the agents’ utility function is linear - concave (in which case, ey
and eo, if co-monotonic, have to be negatively correlated), or concave - linear, i.e. whatever
the pattern of the risk aversion over the agents’ lifetime, or if the endowment when old
is deterministic. On the other hand, a deﬁned contributions policy can never be welfare
improving if the endowments when young are riskless.
Condition (16) is somewhat harder to interpret than the analogous condition we obtained
in the case of deﬁned beneﬁts. It is useful to consider the special case where agents have
the same constant relative risk aversion utility function when young and old, given by




when the coeﬃcient of risk aversion is σ 6= 1 and by u(c) = v(c) = log(c) when σ = 1. In













6Again if we are at the golden rule, the inequality on the right hand side of (16) is also a suﬃcient
condition for the existence of an improving deﬁned contributions policy.
16Note that when σ = 1, i.e. when consumers have logarithmic preferences, this inequality
can never hold, thus a deﬁned contributions social security system can never be Pareto-
improving.
When σ < 1, an improvement is only possible, when the endowment of the young and
the old vary co-monotonically, if in all states where the endowment when young is high (resp.
low), the endowment when old is low (resp. high), i.e. the two are negatively correlated,
or the endowment when old is also high but exhibits less variability than the endowment
when young. Observe that, somewhat surprisingly, in this case an improvement is always
possible if endowments when old are riskless, endowments when young are risky and the
economy is suﬃciently close to the golden rule. With social security, consumption when old
becomes risky; however, the ‘representative agent’ is compensated for this by having less
risk when young.
On the other hand, when σ > 1 the situation is somewhat analogous to the one we
found in the case of deﬁned beneﬁts: an improvement is only possible (again under the
comononicity assumption) if whenever the endowment when young is high the endowment
when old is even higher, thus when endowments when young and old are positively correlated
and the endowments when old ﬂuctuate more than the endowments when young. Note that
in this case an improvement is impossible if the endowments when old are riskless. Here
the intuition from the deﬁned beneﬁts case carries over.
5 Eﬀects on the Price of Long-lived Assets
As explained in the introduction, the analysis of the pure exchange case without land
neglects many important general equilibrium eﬀects of the introduction of a social security
system. In this section we examine the eﬀect of the introduction of social security on
the price of long-lived assets such as land. Hence we maintain the restriction that capital
and labor are not productive but suppose now that land is productive, and constitutes an
inﬁnitely-lived asset in unit net supply paying each period a dividend ds ≡ ∂f(0,1,1;s)/∂b
whenever shock s realizes.
In the presence of land a stationary equilibrium still exists both without and with a
(stationary) social security system. We will again examine the eﬀects on the stationary
equilibrium of introducing an inﬁnitesimal amount of social security, starting from a sit-
uation with zero social security transfers, ν = 0. We still consider the case where the
introduction of social security is announced at some date t, after some history st, and after
all trades have taken place at that date, and will start being implemented from date t + 1,
at every successor node of st; at t + 1 the price of land q varies and settles immediately at
its new stationary equilibrium level. The correct timing of the introduction turns out to be
even more crucial here.
Fact 1 In the presence of land, announcing the social security policy one period before its
17introduction is always better than not announcing it; furthermore, if the policy is announced
more than one period in advance, it can never be welfare improving.
The argument is as follows. Suppose the policy were announced at date t and starts
being implemented only at, say, t + Z, for Z > 1. Then at date t + Z − 1 the price of land
will settle at its new stationary equilibrium level which, as we show below, will be lower.
The prices at all intermediate dates (between t + 1 and t + Z − 2) may then also vary;
whatever the direction in which they vary, since the price at t+Z −1 will be lower, we can
say that for at least one generation the price, compared to the initial equilibrium, will be
greater or equal when young and lower when old. The welfare of this generation will thus
necessarily decrease, so that a welfare improvement cannot be attained in this case.
The net transfer Ts induced by the introduction of social security is now equal to the
sum of the direct transfer τs prescribed by it and the indirect transfer induced by the change
in the equilibrium price of land (the price eﬀect). Since the total outstanding amount of
land is 1, we have:




To simplify the analysis, we will consider ﬁrst the case in which agents’ preferences are
linear concave, i.e. u(x) = x, v(x) concave. In this case, it is easy to solve explicitly for the





s + q + ds + ντs). (19)
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s + q + ds) + (q + ds)v00(eo
s + q + ds))
.
Hence the indirect transfer induced by the introduction of social security is deterministic.




s) ≤ 0, so that the price eﬀect is always negative. Thus in the current
set-up a social security transfer scheme might even make the initial old (i.e., the agents who
are old at date t) worse oﬀ, since the transfer they receive from the scheme may be more
than oﬀset by the reduction in the value of their land holdings.
On the basis of the above, we can explicitly determine the total transfer generated by
the policy. For any ¯ s ∈ S:



















s + q + ds is the equilibrium consumption of the agents when old in the initial
equilibrium. Substituting this expression into (5), and noting that its denominator is always
positive (given CPO), and independent of ¯ s, we ﬁnd that the introduction of social security

















Evidently, the old can be made better oﬀ by introducing social security uniformly across
states. However, this will not help future generations.
If we then substitute (20) into (4), we obtain the following necessary and suﬃcient
condition for the introduction of social security to improve all future generations:
X
¯ s∈S
π¯ s(−1 + βv0(co
¯ s))
 











As we saw in the previous section, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for an optimally
designed ideal social security system to be Pareto improving, at an autarkic equilibrium,
with linear concave preferences, is that there is some state ˆ s, for which: βv0(co
ˆ s) > 1. We
will show that, in the presence of land, this same condition also suﬃces for the existence of
a welfare improving ideal system:
Proposition 5 In the presence of land, with linear-concave preferences, a welfare improving
ideal social security system exists if in the equilibrium without social security there exists some
shock ˆ s for which βv0(co
ˆ s) > 1.
The proofs of the propositions in this section can be found in the appendix.
In the presence of land, the condition stated in the above Proposition is only suﬃcient,
no longer necessary for the existence of an improving ideal social security welfare scheme.
This is because the indirect transfer generated by the policy is a negative transfer from the
young to the old. Hence in this case it is possible to design social security schemes which
have better insurance policies by implying a total transfer from the young to the old in the
states where the young are rich, and a transfer from the old to the young when the latter
are poor. As a consequence, a welfare improving scheme may exist even when, for all s, we
have βv0(co
s) ≤ 1. To see this consider the following simple example.
Suppose v(c) = log(c) and eo
s = 0 for all s ∈ S. From (19) we ﬁnd that, in the absence of










β + d¯ s
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β + d¯ s
+ π¯ s(−1 +
β
β + d¯ s
) > 0.
19This is obviously satisﬁed if d¯ s is suﬃciently small compared to other dividends (in partic-
ular, if d¯ s = 0 and ds > 0 for all s 6= ¯ s). The condition for the welfare of the initial old to
increase, (5), becomes in this case:
π¯ s
β + d¯ s
>
βπ¯ s






which is always true.
Since at CPO allocations the old tend to be richer than the young, we can conclude
that the indirect transfer is in the ’right direction’ and its negative sign, combined with the
positive sign of the direct transfer, allows to generate a richer pattern of transfers between
young and old and hence to make an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing easier.
5.1 Deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned contributions
In the two cases which are a more realistic description of actually observed social security
systems, deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned contribution, the overall transfer amounts to a com-
bination of the transfer prescribed by the policy and an indirect transfer like in a negative
deﬁned beneﬁt system. We can then use our ﬁndings for the autarky case, when preferences
are linear-concave, to show:
Proposition 6 In the presence of land, with linear-concave preferences:
- the introduction of a deﬁned beneﬁts social security system is never Pareto-improving;
- the introduction of a deﬁned contributions scheme, on the other hand, will be Pareto-
improving under weaker conditions (on the pattern of covariances of consumption) than under
autarky.
5.2 General preferences
When the utility over consumption when young is no longer linear, the price eﬀect of the
introduction of social security will typically depend on the current shock. Its stochastic
structure, and in particular its correlation with consumption when young and old, will then
play an important role in determining whether or not the introduction of social security is
welfare improving.
For the case of utility functions that are strictly concave both in consumption when
young and old, one cannot obtain, in general, closed-form solutions for the price of land
across states. However it is easy to see from the expression of the ﬁrst order conditions,
qsu0(ey




s + q + ds + ντs). s ∈ S,
that with i.i.d. shocks the price of land is higher when consumption of the young is higher.
To study the exact properties of equilibria one has then to revert to numerical solutions.
In all the examples we considered the price of land decreases after the introduction of social
20security, and the magnitude of the absolute change in the price is positively correlated with
consumption when young. The overall eﬀect of the introduction of social security is again
a combination of the transfer (from the young to the old) prescribed by the policy and
another transfer in the opposite direction, which is bigger when young agents’ consumption
is higher, i.e. somewhat analogous to the direct transfer of a negative deﬁned contributions
system. We can then use again the arguments developed above to determine when such
transfers are improving.
To demonstrate that our ﬁndings obtained for the simpler economies studied in the
previous sections carry over to more general environments, we consider one such example,
where agents have a constant relative risk aversion utility function with coeﬃcient of risk
aversion σ = 2, u(c) = v(c) = −c−1, and β = 1. There are 2 states with π1 = π2 = 0.5 and
land’s dividends are deterministic: d1 = d2 = 0.05. Let e
y
1 = 1, e
y
2 = 2, eo
1 = 0.1, eo
2 = 1.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 1 below show the consumption allocation as well as the
prices of land. Note that consumption when old and when young are positively correlated
and consumption when old is more volatile.
In this economy both the introduction of a deﬁned contributions and of a deﬁned ben-
eﬁts PAYGO system are Pareto-improving. Consider ﬁrst the introduction of a deﬁned
contributions system at the scale ν = 0.01 (i.e. a social security tax of 1 percent of young
agents’ income e
y
s in each state s whose revenue is paid to the current old)7. In the third
column of Table 1 we see the eﬀect of this scheme on the equilibrium price of land: the
price of land always decreases and the magnitude of its change is larger in state 2, when
young agents’ consumption is higher. The large drop in the land price in state 2 leads to a
reversal of the sign of the transfer – the total transfer to the old induced by this policy is
positive in state 1 and negative in state 2. Thus we have a transfer from the young to the
old in state 1 (where the young are richer) and from the old to the young in state 2 (where
the old are richer), with a clear improvement in intergenerational risk sharing. Even though
the direct transfer to the old agents is positively correlated with the young’s, as well as the
old’s, consumption, the total transfer is negatively correlated with it (the indirect transfer
induced by the price eﬀect proves then stronger than the direct transfer prescribed by the
policy) - thus helping the old in hedging their risk. The total transfer is then also negatively
correlated to consumption when young, so the young will face altogether more risk, but as
we noticed their consumption was less volatile than that of the young to begin with. As a
consequence, it can be veriﬁed that both the initial old and all future generations gain.
States cy co q T(0.01) deﬁned contrib. T(0.01) deﬁned beneﬁt
1 0.635 0.515 0.365 0.001 (∆q1 = −0.009) 0.001 (∆q1 = −0.009)
2 1.037 2.013 0.967 -0.001 (∆q2 = −0.021) -0.004 (∆q2 = −0.014)
Table 1: Social security with land.
Consider next the introduction of a deﬁned beneﬁts system, also at the scale ν = 0.01,
7Unlike in the previous analysis, the change in policy is here discrete, though small.
21characterized then by a tax τs = 0.01 in each state s. We can see in the last column of
Table 1 that, as in the case of deﬁned contributions, the strong negative price eﬀect in state
2 leads to a reversal of the sign of the total transfer to the old. Since the direct transfer
is here constant and the size of the (negative) indirect transfer is again, in absolute value,
positively correlated with the young’s, as well as the old’s, consumption, the stochastic
properties of the total transfer are here unambiguously those of the price eﬀect. The total
transfer to the old is then smaller (in fact negative) when the old are richer. We have
therefore an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing which increases the utility of
all future generations. Finally, it is easy to verify that the welfare of the initial old also
increases.
6 Eﬀects on Capital and Output
The preceding analysis abstracted from one important negative eﬀect of social security. If
the equilibrium is conditionally Pareto optimal, and if the introduction of a pay-as-you-
go social security system leads to a reduction in savings, the stock of capital and hence
aggregate equilibrium output and consumption will be reduced for future generations. In
this section we will explore, within a simple set-up, the interaction between these eﬀects
and those on risk sharing of social security. In addition, when the output is subject to
productivity shocks, their properties contribute in an important way to the correlation
between consumption when old and when young and to the stochastic structure of the
indirect transfers generated by social security.
To better focus on the eﬀects of social security on capital and output, we consider here
the case where capital and labor are productive but there is no land and agents have no
endowments of the consumption good. Since young agents supply inelastically their (unit)
endowment of labor and land is not productive, we can write f(k,s) to denote the ﬁrm’s
production function f(k,1,1,s); its ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect to k are then
denoted by fk(k,s) and fkk(k,s), its derivative with respect to l by fl(k,s) and the cross
derivative by fkl(k,s).
We consider again the case where agents have a quasi-linear (linear concave) utility
function since under this condition a stationary equilibrium still exists8, both without and
with a (stationary) social security system. Given the stationarity of allocations, we can
use many of the results obtained in Sections 2 and 4 above. A slight diﬀerence is that the
transition to the new steady state is now not immediate but takes one period. If social
security is introduced at some time t,9 in that period the current old only receive the direct
transfers, there is no additional transfer induced by general equilibrium eﬀects. The current
young agents have to pay the transfer but their wage does not change; when old, next period,
they will receive the transfer prescribed by the policy and will also be aﬀected by the change
8With production this is no longer true with general preferences.
9Whether or not the policy were previously announced does not matter in this case.
22in the interest rate induced by the change in the stock of capital. The new steady state is
then reached at t + 1.
Let k denote the level of savings of an agent when young (or, equivalently, the amount
invested in the ﬁrms’ technology, which will yield the same amount of capital next period).
Since shocks are i.i.d., the ﬁrst order condition for the consumer of the representative




πsfk(k,s)v0(fk(k,s)k + ντs) = 0. (23)
We see from (23) that the agents’ supply of capital is state invariant; as a consequence the
stationary equilibrium is characterized by a constant amount of capital.
The eﬀect on the equilibrium stock of capital of the introduction of an inﬁnitesimal













s is again the equilibrium level of consumption of the representative agent when old
before the introduction of social security, now given by co
s = fk(k,s)k. Observe that this
eﬀect is negative whenever
fkkk
fk ≥ −1, a condition that in what follows we will assume is
always satisﬁed10.
What is the eﬀect of the change in k on the level of the young and old agents’ consump-
tion? For the young, since the equilibrium wage is given by fl and c
y
s = fl(k,s) − k, it is
(flk(k,s) − 1)kν, while for the old it is (fk(k,s) + kfkk(k,s))kν. The constant returns to
scale property of the production function implies that kfkk = −flk. Hence the total change
in the amount of resources available for consumption of the agents when young is:
−τs − kν (kfkk(k,s) + 1), (24)
and for the old it is:
τs + kν (kfkk(k,s) + fk(k,s)). (25)
Note that in this case the changes do not add to zero, but to kν(fk(k,s)−1), thus we do
not only have a transfer but a change in available resources. Since, whenever competitive
equilibria are CPO we have11 E(fk) > 1, we see that the introduction of social security,
by reducing the stock of capital, also lowers the expected value of output and average
consumption.
10The condition is equivalent to capital income, fkk, being increasing in k and is always satisﬁed, for
instance, by Cobb-Douglas and in fact by all CES production functions as long as the elasticity of substitution
is not too small.
11Recalling the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium to be CPO, with linear - concave





s), and using the ﬁrst order conditions for the agents’ optimization
problem, (23), we obtain −Cov(βv
0(c
o),fk) ≤ E(fk) − 1. Since c
o = fkk, the variables v
0(c
o) and fk are
clearly comonotonic and negatively correlated, so we get E(fk) > 1.
23However, it is important to notice that, as long as the policy is introduced at an in-
ﬁnitesimal level, by the envelope theorem the welfare consequences of the induced change in
output are zero. The ﬁrst order conditions for an agent’s optimum (23) imply that the eﬀect
on the agent’s expected utility of increasing consumption when young by dν and lowering it
when old by fk(k,s)dν is zero. Thus, in evaluating the welfare consequences of the changes
in the consumption when young and old given in (24) and (25), we can ignore the last term,
so that the change in resources available to the young is exactly equal to the opposite of
the change in resources available to the old. We can then say that the overall eﬀect of the
policy is a pure transfer eﬀect from the young to the old, given by:
Ts = τs + kνkfkk(k,s), (26)
which is strictly positive for all s.
We should stress that the above property follows from the fact that we are considering
the introduction of an inﬁnitesimal amount of social security, starting from a situation
where its level is zero. When on the other hand a discrete change in policy is considered, its
eﬀect is not simply that of a transfer among generations, but the welfare consequences of
the change in the output level, and hence of the resources available for consumption, have
also to be taken into account. This will become clear in the next Section.
On the basis of the above argument, equation (4) can still be used (now with T as in (26))
to evaluate whether or not the introduction of a social security scheme is welfare improving.
We see from (26) that the indirect transfer induced by the policy has always a positive
sign and varies with the state, according to the stochastic properties of fkk. This is the
opposite of what we found in the case of land, where the indirect transfer was negative and,
with linear concave preferences, deterministic. The fact that the indirect transfer is always
non-negative makes the possibility of an improvement harder (since the overall transfer
will then also be non-negative in every state, which limits the possibilities of improving
intergenerational risk sharing; moreover, at conditionally Pareto eﬃcient allocations, since
the old tend to consume more than the young it is easier to improve the welfare of the
representative generation with a transfer from the old to the young).
The stochastic properties of the indirect transfer, which depend on how the technology
shocks aﬀect fkk, also matter. To see this more precisely, notice ﬁrst that the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the introduction of social security to improve the utility of the
representative generation at the new stationary equilibrium is obtained by substituting (26)




s))(τs + kνkfkk(k,s)) > 0. (27)
As discussed above, the initial old cannot lose since they only obtain the direct transfer.
For the initial young (i.e. born in the period social security is introduced, before the new








s)(τs + kνkfkk(k,s)) > 0, (28)
and is always satisﬁed whenever (27) holds, since kν is negative. Hence in the presence of
production, to ﬁnd an improvement it suﬃces to consider equation (27).
The fact that the total transfer Ts is always nonnegative implies:
Proposition 7 A necessary condition for a stationary (ideal) social security scheme to be
welfare improving (when preferences are linear - concave) is that for at least one state ¯ s
βv0(co
¯ s) > 1.
While in the pure exchange case the above condition is also suﬃcient for the existence
of an ideal welfare improving scheme, this is no longer true in the presence of production
and capital, because the (positive) indirect transfer induced by the policy implies that it is
now more diﬃcult to fully control the risk sharing characteristics of the total transfer.
Having determined in (26) the value of the total transfer associated to any social security
scheme, by a very similar argument to the one of the proof of Proposition 4 we can show




) < 0 < cov(τ + kνkfkk,βv0(fkk)). (29)
From (29) we see that:
Proposition 8 At a CPO equilibrium with production, when preferences are linear - concave:
- an improving deﬁned beneﬁts social security system only exists if the production shocks
are such that (−fkk) and v0(co) are positively correlated;
- an improving deﬁned contributions system only exists if (−fkk), or w = f−fkk, is positively
correlated with v0(co).
When fk and fkk are co-monotonic, the above necessary condition for deﬁned beneﬁts to
be improving is equivalent to the condition that (−fkk) and fkk are negatively correlated.
A similar property holds for deﬁned contribution.
On this basis we can look at various alternative speciﬁcation of the production function,
and in particular of the form of the technology shocks. We examine ﬁrst the case of TFP
shocks, with a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital share α ∈ (0,1):
f(k,s) = ξskα, s ∈ S.
Note that in this case fk = αkα−1ξ, −fkk = α(1 − α)kα−2ξ and w = (1 − α)kαξ are all
perfectly and positively correlated, so the above necessary conditions are all violated, which
implies that neither deﬁned beneﬁts nor deﬁned contributions can ever be improving in
25this set-up. The fundamental problem lies in the fact that with TFP shocks the marginal
utility when old and the total transfer-payment induced by a deﬁned beneﬁts or deﬁned
contributions scheme are negatively correlated: when the old are rich, the transfer-payment
is high and vice-versa.
Alternatively, consider the case where technological shocks are given by a combination
of shocks to the depreciation rate of capital and of TFP shocks:
f(k,s) = ξskα + (1 − δs)k, s ∈ S (30)
If ξ and 1 − δ are suﬃciently negatively correlated, also −fkk = α(1 − α)kα−2ξ and fk =
ξαkα−1 + 1 − δ may be negatively correlated. So we can show that in this case we can
have an improvement both with deﬁned beneﬁts and deﬁned contributions. Consider for
example v(c) = log(c), β = 1, π1 = 0.093, α = 0.3, ξ1 = 1.1, ξ2 = 0.9, δ1 = 1, δ2 = 0. The
equilibrium values are reported in the following table:
States co w −fkk T
1 0.33 0.77 0.231 1.230
2 1.27 0.63 0.189 1.188
Table 2: Deﬁned Beneﬁts SS with shocks to TFP and capital depreciation.
The consumption of the old agents co is now negatively correlated with the indirect
transfer induced by the policy (which is proportional to −fkk). So will be then the total
transfer (Ts)s∈S, reported in the last column of the table, in the case of a deﬁned beneﬁts
scheme; such a scheme is thus improving in this example. Notice that wages are negatively
correlated with co and it can be shown that a deﬁned contributions system will also be
improving.
Another possible speciﬁcation sometimes found in the literature but not examined fur-
ther in this paper is
f(k,s) = kαs, for αs > 0, s ∈ S,
where shocks are to the factors’ shares. In this case, if αs ≤ 0.5 for all s, fk = αkα−1
is positively correlated with −fkk = α(1 − α)kα−2 but possibly negatively correlated with
w = (1 − α)kα. Hence we can have an improvement with deﬁned contributions but there
cannot be one with deﬁned beneﬁts.
We assumed so far that the agents’ utility is linear-concave. When on the other hand
the utility is strictly concave both with respect to the consumption when young and when
old, the stochastic structure of the production shocks also aﬀects the correlation between
the marginal utility of consumption when young and when old which, as we saw in Section
4, plays a crucial role for the welfare eﬀects of social security. Since in such case equilibria
are no longer strictly stationary, a proper examination of it is postponed to the next section.
However, it is still useful to relate the results in this section to the ﬁndings of Bohn
(2003), who considers a situation where agents have logarithmic preferences, both over
26consumption when young and old, u(c) = v(c) = log(c) and that the production function is
as in (30) but with deterministic depreciation. In this situation, equilibrium consumption
values are e cy(st+1) = χ(1−α)ξst+1k(st)α, e co(st+1) = αξst+1k(st)α+(1−δ)k(st) (where 1−χ
is the constant savings rate). These can be approximated abstracting from the variability
of k, so that the second of the two necessary conditions derived in Proposition 3 for the





αξ+(1−δ)k1−α) > 0, which can never hold. This shows that it is diﬃcult to make
a case for a deﬁned beneﬁts social security system in the framework considered by Bohn.
The intuition behind this is that such system, as we argued, shifts risk from the old to the
young. When income when old is less risky to begin with and risk aversion is the same
when old and young, this can never be improving.
7 Pareto-improving introduction of social security
We now investigate the possibility of Pareto improving social security schemes in more
realistic set-ups where there is production which uses labor, capital and land as inputs.
The model is explained in detail in Section 2. As no stationary equilibrium exists for
this model, we have to compute equilibria numerically (we describe the algorithm in the
Appendix).
Since we consider economies with two period - lived agents (i.e. a period corresponds
to 30 years) and without population or technology growth it is not sensible to properly
calibrate the model to match historic prices and quantities. However, we still want to
consider a speciﬁcation of preferences and technology which is roughly consistent with the
calibrations of stochastic OLG models in the existing literature (e.g. Bohn (2003), Smetters
(2004) or, to some extent, Constantinides et al (2002)).
There are 4 i.i.d. shocks, s = 1,...,4, preferences are age-invariant: u(.) = v(.) and
exhibit constant relative risk aversion, of the form (17), with β = 1 and σ = 2. In order to
be able to control the correlation of returns to capital and wages, we consider a speciﬁcation
of the production shocks as at the end of the previous Section, where there is stochastic
depreciation, in addition to TFP shocks:
f(k,l,b;s) = ξskαlγb1−α−γ + (1 − δs)k, s = 1,...,4.
Consistently with the existing literature (e.g. Imrohogolu et al. (2002)) we consider
α = 0.28 and γ = 0.69, i.e. the land share is 3 percent, the capital share 28 percent. We
ﬁx the TFP shocks to be ξ1 = ξ2 = 1.15, ξ3 = ξ4 = 0.85 and the depreciation shocks to be
δ1 = δ3 = ¯ δ + ζ and δ2 = δ4 = ¯ δ − ζ. We set average depreciation ¯ δ to equal 0.9. Given an
average annual depreciation of 5 percent, this is a bit too low for a 30-year time-interval;
however, as we will discuss below a literal interpretation of δ as depreciation is diﬃcult in a
model with two period - lived agents. The size of the TFP shocks is roughly consistent with
what is usually assumed in the literature, and so is the resulting coeﬃcient of variation of
27wages. In Section 7.4 below we discuss how sensitive our ﬁndings are with respect to the
speciﬁcation of the size of the TFP shocks and of the preference parameters.
Given our previous analysis, it is clear that the welfare implications of diﬀerent social
security schemes will crucially depend on the vector (π,ζ), i.e. on the size of the depreciation
shocks and the correlation properties of TFP and depreciation shocks, since this will govern
the pattern of the volatilities and covariance of consumption when old and consumption
when young. In the following we will show how diﬀerent values for this vector will result in
diﬀerent welfare implications. There is no clear-cut empirical guidance in the choice of these
parameters. First, it not possible to obtain good estimates of prices or quantities for 30-year
periods. Secondly, it is well known that it is impossible to match both the Sharpe ratio and
the volatility of consumption in this model. Smetters (2004) who matches average returns
(and considers a model very similar to ours) takes ζ to be around 5, which in turn leads to
unrealistically high consumption volatility. Furthermore, allowing δ to take values larger
than 1 makes it diﬃcult to interpret it as actual depreciation. On the other hand Bohn
(2003) examines the case where depreciation is non-stochastic and close to 1 (i.e. ζ is close to
0). In this paper we consider therefore a variety of diﬀerent parameter speciﬁcations: three
possible values for the size of the depreciation shock, ζ ∈ {0,1,2}, and three speciﬁcations
of the probabilities, π ∈ {(1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4),(0,1/2,1/2,0),(0,1/2,0,1/2)}, describing the
cases where TFP (ξ) and depreciation (1−δ) shocks are, respectively independent, positively
and negatively correlated. For each value of the ’variable parameters’ (π,ζ), we compute
the competitive equilibrium and evaluate the welfare eﬀects of introducing diﬀerent types
of social security systems.
7.1 Equilibrium prices and allocations
In order to get a ﬁrst idea of how the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the parameters (π,ζ)
imply diﬀerent patterns for equilibrium prices and allocations, we report in Table 3 the
resulting summary statistics for average returns to capital, coeﬃcient of variation of returns,
coeﬃcient of variation of aggregate consumption and wages and correlation of returns and
wages. These values can then be compared to estimates from the literature. Smetters (2004)
estimates the ’true’ average return to capital to be 1056 percent (for a 30-year horizon, this
corresponds to 8.5 percent p.a.), and the coeﬃcient of variation to be 0.87. He also estimates
the correlation between returns and wage-income to be 0.75. We will not match any of these
numbers in our speciﬁcations below, but it is instructive to see how the diﬀerent choices of
the parameters could be judged more or less realistic, depending on the resulting pattern
of the equilibrium values.
In the table and the rest of the analysis, we use π1 to refer to (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4), π2
refers to (0,0.5,0.5,0) and π3 to (0.5,0,0,0.5). Since for ζ = 0 equilibria for these three
cases are identical, we only report the results for (0,π1).
28(ζ,π) Avg return coeﬀvar return coeﬀvar wages corr returns wages coeﬀvar agg. cons
(0,π1) 1.32 0.05 0.20 0.27 0.25
(1,π1) 1.84 0.54 0.19 0.08 0.29
(2,π1) 2.71 0.74 0.18 0.10 0.30
(1,π2) 2.02 0.57 0.19 0.996 0.38
(2,π2) 2.96 0.76 0.17 0.999 0.40
(1,π3) 1.67 0.56 0.19 -0.9998 0.04
(2,π3) 2.31 0.79 0.18 -0.9998 0.054
Table 3: Summary statistics of equilibrium values (no SS)
As we see from the table, in all speciﬁcations we are far from matching the average return
to capital or its variation. However, it is also clear that higher values of ζ lead to more
realistic values for these statistics. In this sense, higher values of ζ appear more realistic.
At the same time, they lead to unrealistically high coeﬃcients of variation in aggregate
consumption. When probabilities are given by π2 the correlation of returns and wages is
excessively high, but this case is still interesting given the fact that part of the literature
takes that correlation to be signiﬁcantly positive. On the other hand, speciﬁcation π3 leads
to very low variation in consumption and a correlation of -1, which is quite unrealistic.
However, it allows to clearly see what role the correlation plays for the welfare eﬀects of
social security.
Given the analysis in the previous sections, it is also of interest to know the implications
of the correlation of returns and wages for the correlation of consumption when young and
consumption when old. We report its values below for the case where the depreciation shock
takes its intermediate value:
(1,π1) (1,π2) (1,π3)
0.4897 0.9856 -0.8374
7.2 Decomposing direct and indirect eﬀects
Since we approximate equilibria numerically, we will consider a small but discrete change
in the size of the social security system. As described in Sections 2 and 5 above, we
assume that the social security policy starts operating after the end of a given period, at
all possible direct successor nodes (i.e. for all realizations of the shocks). Its introduction is
not anticipated at the previous date. We trace the eﬀects of the introduction of the policy
along the event tree. We report welfare gains and losses (in wealth equivalents – the exact
computations of welfare changes is reported in the Appendix) for the current generation
and for the next 6 generations. After 5-6 periods welfare changes seem to stabilize.
In order to understand the sources of these welfare changes for the generations far in
the future, we consider a ﬁrst order approximation of such changes and decompose it into
changes induced by intergenerational transfers (in turn divided into direct and indirect
transfers) and changes induced by the crowding-out of capital investment induced by social
29security. The fact that we consider a discrete variation from zero to positive social security
contributions implies that the welfare eﬀects of the changes in the output level can no longer
be ignored.
Suppose social security is introduced immediately after some node st0
. For all t >
t0, denote the consumption in the equilibrium without social security by c(st) and the
consumption in the equilibrium with social security by ˜ c(sT). Denote the total transfer
to the old (given by the sum of the direct and indirect eﬀects of the policy) as To(st) =
˜ co(st) − co(st) and the one from the young by Ty(st) = cy(st) − ˜ cy(st). In the presence
of capital, we also need to deﬁne the total change in the level of aggregate consumption,
L(st) = To(st) − Ty(st).
A ﬁrst order approximation of the eﬀects of the introduction of social security on the



























The last term, (33), captures the welfare eﬀect due to non-stationarity, i.e. the diﬀerence
between the eﬀect on the young agents of generation t and the one on the agents who will be
young at date t+1. Under the assumption that there exists a ergodic Markov equilibrium,
as t → ∞, this last term tends to zero because for any ergodic Markov process (xt) we have
that E0xt − E0xt+1 → 0
The second term, (32), captures the welfare eﬀect of the change in the aggregate level






Finally, the ﬁrst term, (31), measures the welfare eﬀect of the total transfer from the
young to the old at date t + 1; it is then analogous to the expression obtained in the case
of stationary equilibria. It will be useful to decompose this term further: the total transfer
from the young Ty(st+1) is in turn equal to τ(st+1) + ∆q(st+1) + [∆k(st+1) − ∆w(st+1)],
where τ(st+1) is the direct transfer prescribed by the social security scheme, ∆q(st+1) the
transfer induced by the change in the price of land (i.e. it is the diﬀerence between the
price of land with and without social security), and [∆k(st+1) − ∆w(st+1)] is the transfer
induced by the change in the stock of capital (i.e. by the changes in the equilibrium levels




























30These are the three eﬀects we discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. In our computations, the
changes are not inﬁnitesimal and we cannot compute D(t) and C(t) as t → ∞. Nevertheless,
it is instructive to report the values of D(t0 + 6) and C(t0 + 6). It turns out that after 6
periods the changes in these numbers are very small; hence reporting these number allows
us to relate the ﬁndings in this section to the results obtained in the previous sections.
7.3 Introduction of social security
We report in this section the welfare eﬀects of the introduction of a small pay-as-you-go
system. We consider ﬁrst the case of a deﬁned beneﬁts system and then the one of deﬁned
contributions.
7.3.1 Deﬁned beneﬁts
We compute the equilibrium for ν = 0.01 and compare it with the computed equilibrium
for ν = 0. As explained above, to verify that the change is Pareto-improving we compute
the total welfare changes for the next 6 generations after the introduction of the policy.
The following table reports, for generation t0 + 6, the total change in welfare as well as its
decomposition into the various eﬀects explained in the previous section (in order to make
the table easier to read, all welfare changes are multiplied by 104):
(ζ,π) total change Dk Dq Dd crowding out C
(0,π1) -5.5 0.58 4.57 -6.73 -3.78
(1,π1) 0.18 -0.61 4.87 -4.03 -0.05
(2,π1) 1.13 -0.56 4.05 -2.37 0.34
(1,π2) 2.10 -1.29 3.29 -0.47 1.01
(2,π2) 2.64 -0.87. 1.02 2.61 0.78
(1,π3) -5.1 0.92 6.01 -9.52 -2.77
(2,π3) -4.5 0.61 8.03 -11.99 -1.91
Table 4: Welfare eﬀects of introducing a deﬁned beneﬁts system
In all the cases reported above where the total welfare change of generation t0 + 6
is positive we do have in fact a Pareto improvement, since both the current old and all
generations in the transition also gain. For instance, for the parameter value (1,π1) the
current old gain 9.4 and the next 6 generations gain (0.2,0.08,0.14,0.17,0.18,0.18). The
results for the other cases are similar and not reported.
There are several features of the results which are worth commenting on. Both for π1 and
π2, there is a range of parameters generally considered realistic for which the introduction
of social security is Pareto-improving. This is consistent with our earlier analysis as these
are the cases where consumption when old is more volatile than consumption when young
and they are positively correlated. On the other hand, with no depreciation shocks, social
security is never improving. The reason is that in this case the old almost always consume
31more than the young. That is, the marginal utility when old is only very rarely above the
marginal utility when young, and even then the diﬀerence is small, so that transfers from
the young to the old are not improving.
To better understand our ﬁndings it is useful to consider the various components of the
welfare eﬀects of social security, by looking at the other columns of the table above. Note
ﬁrst that, in all cases, the welfare eﬀect of the change in the land price (Dq) is positive
and relatively large. On the other hand the eﬀect of the transfer induced by the change in
the stock of capital (Dk) is negative, with the main exception being the case of negatively
correlated shocks, π3 (this is in line with our ﬁndings in the previous Section, since −fkk
and fk are negatively correlated only for π3). However quantitatively this eﬀect is relatively
small. A crucial role in determining the sign of the total welfare change is played by the
direct transfer Dd. As we saw in Section 4, this eﬀect can only be positive if consumption
when old and when young are positively correlated and when consumption when old is
suﬃciently volatile. This explains why a welfare improvement is easiest to obtain for π2 and
why it is impossible for π3. It also explains why a suﬃciently high size of the depreciation
shock ζ is needed for a positive welfare eﬀects.
Note also that, when ζ is suﬃciently high, the crowding out eﬀect is actually positive.
While we ﬁnd that it is always true that E0(L(st)) is negative, the covariance between L(st)
and u0(co(st)) is in fact likely to be positive. This can be seen by noting that L(st) is
approximately ∆k(st−1)fk(st)−∆k(st); since ∆k is typically negative, in states where the
old are relatively poor and u0(co) is large, fk is low and hence the term ∆k(st−1)fk(st) is
also large.
7.3.2 Deﬁned contributions
We consider now the eﬀects of introducing a deﬁned contribution system. Since the equi-
librium wages lie around 2.5-3 in most of the examples considered, to make the size of
the system which is introduced comparable to the one of the previous section, we set the
contribution rate at 0.35 per cent, i.e. ν = 0.0035. The following table reports again the
eﬀects for generation t0 + 6 :
(ζ,π) total change Dk Dq Dd crowding out C
(0,π1) -6.95 0.79 5.62 -8.46 -4.64
(1,π1) -0.40 -0.36 5.76 -5.53 -0.31
(2,π1) 0.35 -0.30 4.96 -4.23 0.33
(1,π2) 0.72 -0.68 5.30 -4.05 0.31
(2,π2) 1.01 -0.42 4.12 -2.71 0.33
(1,π3) -2.99 0.34 5.10 -6.88 -1.42
(2,π3) -2.32 0.24 6.21 -8.13 -1.01
Table 5: Welfare eﬀects of introducing a deﬁned contributions system
32Just as in the previous section, in all cases where the total change is positive, the current
old and all future generations gain from an introduction of social security. Comparing the
table above with the previous one, we see that it is slightly more diﬃcult to obtain an
improvement than it was in the case of deﬁned beneﬁts. The pattern of the welfare changes
as well as of their components across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations is largely analogous to the
deﬁned beneﬁt case.
7.4 Sensitivity analysis
We discuss in this section how sensitive our ﬁndings are with respect to the speciﬁcation of
the preference parameters σ (coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion) and β (discount factor).
We consider the values σ ∈ {0.5,2,4} and β = {0.44,1}. These values cover the ranges
considered realistic in the literature.
The analysis above showed that the higher the depreciation shock ζ, the more likely it
is that the introduction of a social security system is Pareto improving. Hence here, for
any given speciﬁcation of the preference parameters (σ,β) ∈ {0.5,2,4} × {0.44,1} and the
probabilities πi, i = 1,2,3, we search for the smallest value of ζ ∈ {0,0.1,0.2,...,2} for
which the introduction of social security constitutes a Pareto-improvement in the implied
economy. If there is no improvement for ζ = 2, we report ”> 2”. The following table shows
the results for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of (σ,β) and π1,π2:
Deﬁned beneﬁts
π\(σ,β) (0.5,1) (2,1) (4,1) (0.5,0.44) (2,0.44 (4,0.44)
π1 > 2 1.0 0.5 > 2 1.4 0.7
π2 1.9 0.5 0.3 > 2 0.8 0.4
Deﬁned contributions
π\(σ,β) (0.5,1) (2,1) (4,1) (0.5,0.44) (2,0.44 (4,0.44)
π1 > 2 1.3 0.6 > 2 1.6 0.8
π2 > 2 0.7 0.4 > 2 0.9 0.5
Table 6: Threshold of ζ for which SS is improving
The table shows that a higher degree of risk aversion always helps, as the set of values
of ζ for which social security is improving expands, while a higher discount rate slightly
hurts. The positive role of σ is not surprising: improvements in risk sharing have a larger
welfare eﬀect for higher σ. Furthermore, in line with what we found earlier, we see that
with deﬁned contributions it is a bit more diﬃcult to have an improvement, but it seems
that for higher risk aversions the diﬀerence becomes very small. Note in particular, that for
a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of 4 and π2 an improvement is possible in an economy
with only very modest depreciation shocks, where δs ∈ {0.6,1.2} for all s.
For the speciﬁcation of the probabilities given by π3 we ﬁnd that an improvement is not
possible in any of the cases considered. For the case of low risk aversion this is somewhat
33surprising, since our previous analysis suggests that, for the case of deﬁned contributions, a
negative correlation between consumption when old and consumption when young should
help. However, it should be pointed out that the condition found in Proposition 4 is only
necessary, not suﬃcient for an improvement, and in the situation considered here it still
turns out that the welfare eﬀect of the direct transfer is signiﬁcantly negative, which should
also reﬂect the fact that the economy is in this case rather far from the golden rule. In fact,
for ζ = 1, we obtain Dl = 10.07, Dk = 0.40 and Dd = −13.05. As before, the direct eﬀect
is crucial for the overall welfare eﬀect.
Lastly, we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the variance of the TFP shock,
ξ. We consider the case ξ1 = ξ2 = 1.08, ξ3 = ξ4 = 0.92, where the TFP shock has a lower
variance. We ﬁnd that both with deﬁned beneﬁts and with deﬁned contribution, it is a bit
more diﬃcult to obtain an improvement, but the diﬀerences are quantitatively quite small.
For deﬁned beneﬁts, with σ = 2, β = 1 and π2 an improvement is obtained for all ζ > 0.7.
The results for other speciﬁcations are very similar.
8 Pareto improving reform of social security
We now consider a situation where a social security system is already in place. In this case
we investigate welfare improving changes in the system, both in its size and its nature, and
hence discuss the optimal size and optimal reform of the system. In this section, we focus
on the benchmark case of the preference parameters: σ = 2, β = 1.
8.1 Optimal size of the system
The actual size of the system in the US lies around 12 percent. By most accounts this is
viewed as too large a system. However, it seems that for some of our parameterizations
above, this proves actually to be the ’right size’.
To investigate the optimal size of a social security system, we suppose the economy
starts with a social security system of size ν and study for which values of ν it is Pareto-
improving to further increase the size of the system. We see that the larger the initial size ν
of the system the harder it is that an increase in ν is welfare improving. We search then for
all ν ∈ {0,0.01,0.02,...,1} for the largest value of ν for which a (small) increase in the size
of the social security system is Pareto-improving. In the second line of the following table
we report, for diﬀerent parameter speciﬁcations, the level ν of the tax rate in a deﬁned
contributions system such that at ν − 0.005 an increase by 0.005 of the tax rate is still
slightly Pareto-improving, but at ν an increase by 0.005 makes future generations worse oﬀ.
In the ﬁrst line of the table we report then the corresponding values for a deﬁned beneﬁts
system; in that case, to make the numbers comparable, the size ν of the system (i.e. the
level of the contributions paid) is written as percentage of average wages.
34π1, ζ = 2 π2, ζ = 1 π2, ζ = 2
Deﬁned beneﬁts 0.11 0.12 0.21
Deﬁned contributions 0.08 0.09 0.19
Table 7: Optimal size of the SS system
We see from the table that for a variety of speciﬁcations of the parameters a social
security system that is roughly the size of the current US system seems about optimal.
8.2 Risk-sharing reforms
As argued above, a large deﬁned contributions system as the one observed in many industrial
countries appears to be at, if not above, the optimal size of such system. As a consequence,
welfare improvements cannot be attained by further increasing the size of the system. The
question then arises if a reform of such a system can lead to a Pareto-improvement. It is
clear that this is only possible if the transfer to the old is increased in at least one state,
given that it should be decreased in others. Given our theoretical results in Sections 2 and
4 above, a candidate reform would be to decrease the transfers in states where the old are
relatively rich while increasing them (to compensate the current old) in states where the
old are relatively poor.
Consider the case where ζ = 1, π = π2 and a deﬁned contributions system is present
with tax rate ν = 0.10. Hence from table 7 we see that the size of the system is slightly too
large for the economy considered. In this situation, however, quantitatively large welfare
gains can still be obtained by reforming the system, in particular by making the tax rate
state dependent. If the system is changed to the following one, τ(st) = 0 for st = 2 and
τ(st) = 0.2w(st) for st = 3, i.e. if for the bad return state the payroll tax is increased to
20 percent while in the good return state it is decreased to zero, the welfare gains for the
current old and all future generations in percent are given by
(2.9,2.6,2.6,3.1,3.2,3.2).
That is, the representative future generation gains 3.2 percent in wealth equivalence, while
the current old, although they paid the full tax of 10 percent when they were young, gain
in expected value 2.9 percent through the change in the risk-sharing characteristics of the
system.
9 Conclusion
The idea that a pay-as-you-go social security system can lead to enhanced intergenerational
risk sharing has been formalized in various papers (see the literature review in the introduc-
tion). However, it is also well known that the general equilibrium eﬀects of social security
lead to lower capital formation and hence lower consumption for future generations if the
35economy is dynamically eﬃcient. In most quantitative studies this second eﬀect seems to
overcompensate any beneﬁcial eﬀects of enhanced risk sharing.
We show that the presence of a durable good like land as an additional factor of pro-
duction mitigates the crowding out eﬀect and that intergenerational risk-sharing provides
a normative justiﬁcation of a pay-as-you-go social security system even if one takes into
account the eﬀects on the capital stock and equilibrium prices and if markets are complete.
It is crucial to note that in our framework social security is only desirable under an ex-ante
welfare criterion: in the economies considered competitive equilibria are in fact always in-
terim eﬃcient, the only possibility for an improvement is then due to agents’ inability to




In Sections 7 and 8 we seek to ﬁnd an admissible range for the capital stock Θ ⊂ R++ as
well as functions from the current shock and the beginning of period capital stock to land
prices and investments, ρq : Θ × S → R+, ρk : Θ × S → Θ such that for all shocks ¯ s ∈ S
and all k− ∈ Θ the following inequalities hold for small  ≥ 0
k − 1 + β
P




k − ρq(k, ¯ s) + β
P





where cy = fl(k,1,1; ¯ s)−ρk(k, ¯ s)−ρq(k, ¯ s) and co
s = ρk(k, ¯ s)fk(ρk(k, ¯ s),1,1;s)+ρq(ρk(k, ¯ s),s),
for all s ∈ S; fb(ρk(k, ¯ s),1,1;s)) ≡
∂f(ρk(k,¯ s),1,1;s)
∂b . The terms on the left hand side of (A.1)
constitute the ﬁrst order conditions for a competitive equilibrium without social security;
suitably modiﬁed expressions hold in the case where a social security system is present.
We use a collocation algorithm as described for example in Krueger and Kubler (2004) to
approximate these functions numerically. For this, we write ρk and ρq as cubic splines (i.e.
piece-wise cubic polynomials) with 200 collocation points. We solve for the unknown spline
coeﬃcients using time-iteration, i.e. given an approximation for ρk and ρq next period, ρN
k
and ρN
q , we solve for optimal choices and prices the current period on a grid of 200 points
and interpolate the solution to obtain new functions ρN+1
k and ρN+1
q . This procedure is









k k∞ < 10−10.




k , we determine the error in the above system of
equations. If  < 10−5, we accept this as an approximate solution and report equilibrium
prices and welfare levels for this approximation.
12Under an interim criterion the presence of land tends to decrease rather than increase the scope for
social security because it provides an important tool for self-insurance.
36Welfare computations
As already said in Section 7.2, we suppose that social security is introduced, unantici-
pated, at some time t0 + 1 for all possible realizations of the shocks, 1,...,4, i.e. at nodes
(st0
,1),...,(st0
,4). Let ˜ cy,˜ co denote the equilibrium consumption levels in the economy
with social security and cy,co the consumption levels in the economy without social se-
curity. Given our assumption of CRRA utility functions, the welfare change for the ini-
tial old, in wealth equivalent terms (i.e. the percentage change ∆ in consumption, uni-








−1. The welfare change for a generation born T generations after
the introduction of social security T = 0,1,... is then given by
 P
st0+Tst0 π(st0+1+T|st0











Proof of Proposition 5. In Proposition 2 we showed that, under the same condition of
this Proposition, the following transfer scheme is always welfare improving, at an autarkic
equilibrium: τˆ s > 0, τs = 0 for all s 6= ˆ s. We will show that, in the presence of land, it is
always possible to design an ideal social security system for which the set of total transfers
is exactly the same (and hence will be Pareto improving).
To make the notation a bit simpler we will assume that for all other s 6= ˆ s, βv0(co
s) < 1
(it should become clear that this is an innocuous assumption).





s)) + πˆ s(1 − δ)βv00(co
ˆ s)(q + dˆ s) = 0.
Consider then a stationary social security system characterized by τˆ s = 1 and τs = δ for all
s 6= ˆ s. By substituting the previous expression in (20), we ﬁnd that this system will induce
the following total transfers across generations:







s)) + πˆ s(δ − 1)βv00(co




s) + (q + ds)v00(co
s)]
, for s 6= ˆ s.
which, given the above speciﬁcation of δ, equals zero, and














s) + (q + ds)v00(co
s)]
> 0
where the sign follows from the conditional optimality of the equilibrium and the fact that
δ < 1. Under the condition βv0(co
ˆ s) > 1, this policy will clearly improve future generations,
as well as the initial old, i.e. satisfy (22) and (21). 
37Proof of Proposition 6. If τs is constant across all shocks s, since the price eﬀect
dq
dν is also, as we saw, independent of s, so will be the total transfer induced by the policy.
From (20) we see in fact that, when τs = τ for all s:











s) + (q + ds)v00(co
s)]
,
which is constant across s. Since in Proposition 3 we showed that, when agents have linear -
concave preferences, a deterministic transfer from the young to the old can never be welfare
improving, this implies that a deﬁned beneﬁts system can never be welfare improving in
this case.
In the case of a deﬁned contributions system, on the other hand, the total transfer
















s + q + ds) + (q + ds)v00(eo
s + q + ds)]
.
Since the second term is always negative and independent of s, we can say the total eﬀect
of a deﬁned contributions system with land is analogous to that of a combination of a
deﬁned contributions and a negative deﬁned beneﬁts scheme under autarky. By comparing
Equations (8) and (1), we see that the latter has always (at least with linear - concave
preferences) a positive eﬀect on the welfare of the representative generation. Hence the
conditions (on the parameters of the economy) under which a deﬁned contributions system
is Pareto improving are weaker than the ones we found under autarky. 
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